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The knowledge-capital (KC) model of MNEs is now a widely adopted empirical approach to 
explaining the location and production decisions of global firms based on both horizontal and 
vertical motivations. While most of the existing studies have focused on highly aggregated 
national data, we extend this model to sectoral data consisting of broad manufacturing 
industries and explicitly account for the dynamic nature of international investment data.  The 
empirical results from a dynamic panel data analysis indicate that that the predictions of the KC 
model regarding MNE behavior vary by the type of industry.  Production processes in 
electronics and transportation-equipment are more characterized by efficient vertical 
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1.  Introduction 
The relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and international trade has 
long generated great interest.  This interest is sharpened by the phenomenal growth in the 
magnitude of global FDI flows in the last two decades.  FDI arises from decisions of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) either to capture local markets abroad through horizontal 
investments in similar products (Markusen, 1984; Horstmann and Markusen, 1992) or to take 
advantage of lower-cost factors offshore through vertical investments in labor-intensive 
assembly stages (Helpman, 1984).  The knowledge-capital (KC) model of MNEs, as described 
in Markusen (2002) and initially estimated by Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (CMM, 2001), is 
now a widely used empirical approach for explaining the location and production decisions of 
global firms in an integrated framework.  The model provides predictions about the nature of 
firms that arise endogenously in response to changes in market sizes, country similarity, factor 
endowments, impediments to trade and investment, and various interactions among them.  The 
firms can be national exporters or either horizontal or vertical MNEs.  The model also can be 
used to analyze joint decisions between production for local markets and exports, making it a 
theory of both investment and trade (Markusen and Maskus, 2002).  Recently it has been 
extended to the context of three factor endowments (Bergstrand and Egger, 2007).  
The contributions of this paper are three-fold. First, we investigate whether the KC 
model predictions hold for sectoral investment. The analysis examines the relationship between 
relative endowments of knowledge-based factors and other FDI determinants on local affiliate 
sales and exports. Specifically, we estimate the model for all manufacturing industries 
(aggregated) and several manufacturing industry sub-sectors (chemicals and allied products; 
electronics; food and kindred products; industrial machinery and equipment; transportation   2 
equipment).  Surprisingly, few previous investigations have applied the knowledge-capital 
model to sectoral data.   
Interest in industry-level analysis arises to the extent that firms in an industry display 
the KC model’s basic characteristics of increasing returns associated with headquarters 
services.  Those headquarters services include marketing, research and development (R&D), 
strategic planning, and related centralized activities that generate knowledge.  Because the 
resulting information advantages may be shared at low cost among multiple locations, 
knowledge becomes the essential determinant of strategic decisions by MNEs.  All 
manufacturing industries share these characteristics to some extent, though some are more 
R&D-intensive or marketing-intensive than others.  At the same time, the underlying 
heterogeneity of firms suggests that different industries would react in varying ways to changes 
in the basic determinants of the KC model (Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004).  Accordingly, 
it becomes interesting to assess this variation, something that has not been widely studied to 
date.  
Second, we adapt the three-endowment KC approach of Bergstrand and Egger (2007), 
which they applied solely to aggregate FDI data, to explicitly account in the empirical work for 
the role of differences in relative physical capital endowments on investment decisions at the 
sectoral level.  Introduction of this third factor should offer a more robust explanation of 
industry-level MNE activities than relying only on skilled-labor and total labor.    
Third, given the dynamic nature of investment decisions, we apply the generalized 
methods of moments (GMM) technique to a panel data set involving thirty-nine FDI-recipient 
countries over the fifteen-year period 1985-1999. This approach is an improvement on most   3 
previous empirical studies of the knowledge-capital model, for they adopted a static regression 
framework.     
The main finding from this study is that differences in relative skilled-labor and 
physical-capital endowments have a positive and significant effect on foreign affiliate sales and 
exports across various industries.  These results suggest that horizontal (market-seeking) FDI 
motivation for MNE activities is prevalent at the industry-level. The notable exceptions are in 
the electronics and machinery manufacturing sectors, where the empirical results show that 
differences in relative skill labor endowments have a positive effect on affiliate sales 
(suggesting vertical fragmentation) while differences in relative physical capital endowments 
reduce affiliate sales (suggesting market-seeking FDI in countries with similar capital stocks).   
The remainder of this article is organized as follows.  In Section 2 we lay out the KC 
model and note its predictions for affiliate sales and exports.  In Section 3 we summarize the 
empirical methodology and discuss the data.  In Section 4 we describe the empirical results and 
in Section 5 we present our conclusions.  
 
2. The Knowledge-Capital Model 
  In this section we review earlier major studies of the KC model and discuss its theoretical 
underpinnings. 
Overview of Previous Studies 
Prior to the development of the KC model, previous analyses presented separate models 
for the two main types of FDI.  In the case of horizontal FDI, MNEs set up duplicate 
production plants through affiliates in a foreign country in order to meet domestic demand in 
the host country.  Thus, the potential determinants of horizontal FDI include market size and   4 
national income.  Several studies have found empirical support for the importance of market 
size and income (Kravis and Lipsey, 1982; Schmitz and Bieri, 1972; CMM, 2001).  Since 
horizontal FDI could potentially substitute for exports to host countries, the effect of trade 
barriers on FDI has also been widely debated.  For example, under the tariff-jumping 
hypothesis FDI will be encouraged when there are obstacles to trade (Smith, 1987; Blonigen 
and Feenstra, 1997).  Hence, when trade costs are low, trade liberalization is expected to reduce 
the level of horizontal FDI as goods can move more freely across countries.  The empirical 
evidence has been mixed.  While some studies found a positive relationship between trade 
barriers and FDI (Barrell and Pain, 1999), others have found conflicting results (Culem, 1988; 
Blonigen and Feenstra, 1997).  
  In the context of vertical FDI, MNEs exploit low-cost inputs by fragmenting their 
production processes into stages across countries so that skilled-labor-intensive (knowledge-
based) production occurs at the skilled-labor abundant home country and unskilled-labor-
intensive production (e.g., assembly processes) occurs in the foreign host country.  Since 
vertical FDI often requires the export of final goods from host to home country, the ease of re-
export is a key determinant of vertical FDI.  While host nations’ demand factors (e.g., market 
size and income) are not as important to vertical FDI, relative factor prices and trade costs are 
more relevant.  Hence, previous empirical investigations of the determinants of vertical FDI 
have examined factors such as labor costs, trade openness, investment, and trade costs 
(Brainard, 1997; Markusen and Maskus, 2002).  
Theoretical Model Structure 
  In this section we briefly overview the theoretical model developed in Markusen (2002) 
and CMM (2001).  This approach includes three principal assumptions.  First, the blueprints,   5 
manuals, formulas, and other services developed by  knowledge-generating activities, such as 
R&D, may be performed at a centralized location and supplied to multiple production facilities at 
low cost.  Second, these centralized activities are knowledge-intensive, and therefore skilled-
labor intensive, relative to production. Third, such services are joint inputs and may be used 
simultaneously by many production plants.  The first two assumptions are consistent with vertical 
fragmentation of the firm, locating R&D where skilled-labor is abundant and production where 
unskilled-labor is abundant.  Further, if there are scale economies at the plant level, larger local 
market sizes will encourage inward production location. The third assumption, that knowledge is 
jointly used, supports organization-level scale economies and motivates horizontal investments to 
replicate activities in different locations.  
  The basic KC model assumes there are two goods, two countries, and two factors, 
unskilled-labor and skilled-labor, which are internationally immobile.
1  One good is labor-
intensive and produced under constant returns to scale in a competitive industry.  The other is 
skilled-labor-intensive and experiences both plant-level and firm-level increasing returns to 
scale.  Firm-level increasing returns come by assuming that the total fixed costs of headquarters 
and two production plants are less than the total fixed costs of two single-plant firms.  There is 
Cournot competition in this good under free entry and exit.  Within a firm producing this good, 
headquarters services are centralized and a firm may have plants in one or both countries.  
  There are three types of firms in this model. First, there are horizontal MNEs that have 
production plants in both countries but headquarters in just one country.  Second, there are 
national firms that maintain a single plant and headquarters in one of the countries.  Third, there 
are vertical MNEs with a production plant in one country and headquarters in the other.     6 
  The determination of how prominent these firm types are in equilibrium depends on 
various country characteristics.  The emergence of national firms is most likely when the home 
country is both large and skilled-labor abundant, encouraging such firms to combine 
headquarters services and production in one location, exporting to the other country.  National 
firms also are most likely when the two nations are similar in size and relative factor 
endowments, while trade costs are low.  In this case there is little payoff to vertical investment, 
while horizontal investment is discouraged by low transport costs.  National firms are also 
likely where foreign investment barriers are high.  
  Horizontal MNEs are more likely to emerge when the nations are similar in size and 
relative endowments and transport costs are high.  In this case MNEs will have headquarters in 
their home countries but locate production plants in each other’s market. This is the classic case 
of market-seeking investment.  Similarity in size is important for if there were a large disparity, 
firms in the larger country would avoid investing in costly capacity in the smaller country.  
Similarity in endowments matters because if the countries varied in relative skill and labor 
supplies the incentive would be to locate headquarters in the skill-abundant location and 
production plants in the labor-abundant place. This analysis therefore also suggests that vertical 
MNEs are favored where there are substantial endowment differences unless trade costs are 
high.   
  Predictions for export behavior in the KC model come under an assumption of identical 
and homothetic preferences and we simply describe them here (Markusen and Maskus, 2002).  
In cases where national firms tend to dominate there will be two-way trade in manufactured 
goods produced under increasing returns.  As incentives for horizontal MNEs become stronger, 
either due to more similarity in relative endowments and size or to higher trade costs or lower   7 
investment costs, local affiliate sales will displace international trade.  Here, horizontal 
investment is a substitute for international trade in goods. 
  However, where vertical MNEs are prevalent, due to significant differences in 
endowments and country size, exports from the host country to the parent country will be 
significant and dependent on trade costs.  Further, while this possibility does not arise in the 
two-country KC model, affiliate production could be aimed at exports to third markets.  In this 
case the investment could follow a mix of market-seeking horizontal incentives (e.g., Ireland 
within the larger EU) and factor-based vertical incentives (e.g., Mexico within NAFTA).   
Moreover, in this case trade and FDI could be complements as more investment supports more 
exports of assembled final goods (Blonigen, 2001). 
  In this context, differences among sectors become interesting.  Some industries may be 
more likely to display essentially horizontal motivations for FDI and affiliate production, with 
limited exports back to the parent country and even to third markets.  Others may reflect 
export-platform investment, following a mix of incentives (Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen, 
2007).  Still others may be essentially vertical in nature, tending to fragment production 
according to relative factor costs.  In short, location decisions are complex (Yeaple, 2003).   
3. Econometric Specification 
We turn next to our estimation approach and describe variable construction and data 
sources. 
Model Specifications and Hypotheses 
We follow the basic specification set out in Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001), which 
was designed to capture the complex non-linearities implied in the KC model.  That 
specification is as follows:   8 
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where the subscript u indicates the United States (always the home nation), j indexes the   
destination (host) country, k designates the industry, and t denotes the year.  The variables are 
defined as follows.  AFFACT is a measure of the price-adjusted sectoral activity of affiliates in 
the host country, taken here to be total sales, sales in the local market, total exports, exports to 
the parent country, or exports to third countries.  For some sectors there are not enough 
disclosed observations in the data to estimate equations for the last two variables. 
GDPSUM is the sum of  host-country GDP and parent-country GDP.  We use only the 
outward FDI data in the publicly available database from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA), implying that the parent country is always the United States.  Its GDP varies over time 
but for any year the only variation across countries in GDPSUM is provided by the host-
country figures.  GDPSUM is a measure of total bilateral market size and should have a 
positive coefficient in all equations. 
GDPDSQ is the squared difference in real GDP.  The coefficient should be negative 
because the KC theory predicts that affiliate sales volume in horizontal production increases as 
market sizes become more equal.  Again, the prediction is less clear for exports: higher affiliate 
total sales are needed to support more exports (a component of sales) but it is possible that a 
rise in local sales could substitute for exports, generating a negative coefficient on the latter. 
SKLDIFF is the difference in the ratio of skilled employment to total employment 
between the parent and host countries.  Because the United States is the parent in all our 
observations and is more skill-abundant than most countries in the panel data, this measure is 
positive in the bulk of cases, permitting us to avoid the problem with two-way data pointed out   9 
by Blonigen, Davies, and Head (2003).
2  The coefficient on this variable should be positive, 
because firms tend to have their headquarters in the skill-abundant country and an increase in 
this difference should expand incentives for vertical FDI.  In subsequent specifications we add 
PKDIFF, or differences in physical-capital endowments (capital per worker) and estimate 
equations with both relative endowments included.  The impacts of physical capital should be 
qualitatively similar to those of skills in this extended model. 
The next variable is the product of the difference in GDP and the difference in relative 
skill endowments (GDPD*SKLD).  GDPD is positive in all observations, given the large size 
of the US economy.  From the basic KC theory it is possible to predict that this coefficient 
should be negative.  The United States is considerably larger in GDP than its investment 
partners.  Giving the United States more skilled-labor (an increase in SKLDIFF) in this 
situation would diminish incentives for horizontal FDI relative to expanded incentives for 
vertical investment.  In short, this variable is designed to capture the tradeoffs as the data depart 
from similar relative endowments, given large differences in country size. 
The variable IC is a measure of perceived investment costs in the host country and 
should have a negative coefficient.  Trade costs in the host country are measured by TCj  and it 
should have a positive coefficient on sales and local sales.  Trade costs in the parent country are 
measured by TCu  and it should have a negative impact on sales and exports to the United 
States.  We also include an interaction term between host-country trade costs and squared skill-
labor endowment differences.  This variable attempts to capture the ideas that increases in trade 
costs could encourage horizontal FDI, while diminishing vertical FDI.  Recall that because 
horizontal incentives are greatest when relative skill endowments are close together.   Thus, for 
given level of trade costs an increase in endowment differences should reduce horizontal FDI   10  
and the coefficient should be negative.  However, this is a weak prediction given the multiple 
tradeoffs involved.
 3  
General Method of Moments (GMM) Estimation 
Given the availability of panel data, a simple pooled ordinary least-squares (OLS) 
regression of equation (1) would be inappropriate since it would not adequately address the 
problem of unobserved heterogeneity, nor adequately exploit the time variation in our 
variables. Pooled OLS regression estimates may suffer from omitted variable bias because of 
unobserved heterogeneity effects.  Error-component models (e.g., fixed-effects and random-
effects models) are commonly used to remedy the problem of unobserved heterogeneity.   
Furthermore, since many economic relationships are dynamic in nature, the static model 
specification in equation (1) may be too restrictive (Baltagi, 2005, p. 135).  This is particularly 
true in the case of investment decisions by multinational enterprises, whose past activities could 
have a significant effect on current (and future) FDI levels.  Thus, it is more appropriate to 
specify a dynamic version of the model by including a lagged endogenous variable on the right-
hand side.  We reformulate equation (1) as a general dynamic panel regression model of the 
form:  
k








ujt y    is sectoral FDI activity by affiliates,  ujt x is the vector of explanatory variables for 
which cross-sectional and time-series data are collected;  j   and  t  are unobserved host-
country-specific (e.g., geographic location and culture) and time-specific (e.g., policy reforms)   11  
parameters, respectively.  The term 
k
ujt   denotes a random error, and the subscripts u, j, k and t 
denote home country, host country, sector, and time periods, respectively.  
While the static case (equation (1)) could be estimated with either a fixed-effects or 
random-effects model, this may not be appropriate for the dynamic panel model.  Endogeneity 
concerns become an issue in the estimation of equation (2) because the lagged endogenous 
regressor will be correlated with the error term (Baltagi, 2005, p. 135).  Thus, regression 
estimates from both fixed-effects and random-effects estimators will be biased and inconsistent 
in panels with large cross sections and a small time span.  To address this problem, an 
instrumental variable (IV) estimator is needed. Thus, to estimate equation (2) we apply the 
generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
Arellano and Bover (1995).  The GMM panel estimator controls for country-specific fixed 
effects and the potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables.   The country-specific fixed 
effects are eliminated by taking first differences of equation (2) such that:
4 












ujt x x y y y y                      (3) 






ujt x y y           1  
Next, the potential endogeneity issues and the correlation between the lagged dependent 
variable and error term in equation (3) are addressed via the use of instruments. For panels with 
a short time span, Blundell and Bond (1998) showed that the there are potential efficiency gains 
by using lagged differenced variables as instruments. The GMM dynamic panel estimator 
requires the following moments condition:  
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Equation (4) implies that the values of y lagged two or more periods may be used as 
instruments in the GMM model.  Also, based on equation (5), the explanatory variables 
it x could serve as additional instruments.  Thus, in the estimation process, lags of the 
endogenous and exogenous variables are suitable instruments for the differenced GMM 
equations.  Note that the consistency of the GMM technique depends on the validity of the 
instruments employed in the estimation.  
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed two tests for checking the validity of the 
instruments and whether the residuals are serially correlated.  First, the Sargan test for over-
identifying restrictions may be used to determine the validity of the instruments.  Rejection of 
the null hypothesis of no misspecification implies that the model is not appropriate.  Second, 
the Arellano-Bond m1 and m2 statistics may be used to test the null hypothesis of zero first-
order and second-order serial correlation, respectively.  A rejection of m1 and a failure to reject 
m2 implies that the error term is not serially correlated.  We estimate these equations for all 
industries aggregated and separately for individual sectors. 
Data Sources and Variable Definitions 
We assembled a panel data set involving 39 FDI-recipient countries over the 15-year 
period 1985-1999, with information on affiliate activities coming from the BEA.
5  Annual sales 
values and exports were converted into millions of 1990 U.S. dollars using an exchange-rate-
adjusted local wholesale-price index, with exchange rates and price indexes taken from the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS).  Annual real GDP figures were also converted into 
dollars and obtained from the IFS. 
  Skilled-labor abundance is defined as the sum of occupational categories 0/1 
(professional, technical, and kindred workers) and 2 (administrative workers) in employment in   13  
each country, divided by total employment.  These figures are compiled from annual surveys 
reported in the Yearbook of Labor Statistics published by the International Labor Organization.  
In cases where some annual figures were missing, the skilled-labor ratios were taken to equal 
the period averages for each country.  Thus, the variable SKLDIFF is the relative skill 
endowment of the parent country (United States) less that of the host country.  Physical capital 
endowments measure the real stock of capital per worker, in thousands of 1990 U.S. dollars, in 
each country.  This data was constructed from the Penn World Tables using a perpetual-
inventory method and is further described in Baier, Dywer, and Tamura (2006).
6   
Following CMM (2001), the cost of investing in the affiliate country is a simple average 
of several indices of perceived impediments to investment, reported in the World 
Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum.  The investment barriers include 
restrictions on the ability to acquire control in a domestic company, limitations on the ability to 
employ foreign skilled-labor, restraints on negotiating joint ventures, strict controls on hiring 
and firing practices, market dominance by a small number of enterprises, an absence of fair 
administration of justice, difficulties in acquiring local bank credit, restrictions on access to 
local and foreign capital markets, and inadequate protection of intellectual property.  The 
resulting indices are computed on a scale from zero to 100, with a higher number indicating 
higher investment costs.   
  A trade cost index is taken from the same source and is defined as a measure of national 
protectionism, or efforts to prevent importation of competitive products.  It also runs from zero 
to 100, with 100 being the highest trade costs.  All of these indices are based on extensive 
surveys of multinational enterprises.  It should be noted that both the investment cost and trade   14  
cost indices are qualitative and ordinal.  Thus, regression coefficients capture the partial effects 
of changes in the perceived investment and trade costs across countries.   
The resulting data set contains 39 countries (for which adequate data are available), two 
aggregated industries (all industries and total manufacturing) and eight sub-sectors, of which 
we analyze the five in manufacturing.
7  It should be noted that, even at this high level of 
aggregation there are a number of years in which particular variables on affiliate activity were 
not disclosed in the BEA data due to confidentiality reasons.  Thus, there are a few missing 
observations in the sectoral data.
8  In particular cases (i.e., machinery and transportation 
equipment) where observations on affiliate activities were reported as zero, we estimate both a 
GMM and Tobit model specification.  Although the magnitude of the estimates vary across 
estimators, both the GMM and Tobit results yield very similar conclusions regarding the signs 
and statistical significance of the parameter estimates.  Thus, we only discuss details of the 
estimated coefficients from the GMM analysis.  Tobit model results are available upon request 
from authors.   
 
4. Empirical Results 
  We now discuss the econometric results, organized by form of MNE activity. 
Total Affiliate Sales  
  Table 1 presents the results from the GMM model for total affiliate sales, the variable 
most closely associated with the basic KC model predictions.  There are two specifications in 
each case, one including just skill differences as the relative endowment measure and one 
incorporating also relative physical capital endowments.  The first two columns cover all 
manufacturing.  The market-size variable (GDPSUM) and dissimilarity variable (GDPDSQ)   15  
have the anticipated impacts on sales and are significant.  Thus, the larger the bilateral area and 
the more similar the countries are in size, the greater are affiliate real sales.  The variable 
SKLDIFF exerts a negative influence on affiliate sales, suggesting that total manufacturing 
activity is dominated by horizontal motivations.  The size of this coefficient grows larger and 
becomes significant with the introduction of physical-capital endowment differences, PKDIFF.   
  The variables in which factor endowment differences are interacted with GDP 
differences has a negative impact, as expected, though only the PKDIFF interaction is 
significant.  In this specification (and in most others), measured host country’s investment costs 
(ICH) have a negative and statistically significant effect on affiliate sales volumes.  In addition, 
host-nation trade costs (TCH) have statistically insignificant effect on sales volumes in total 
manufacturing.  These findings are similar to those in CMM (2001), where the coefficients on 
investment costs were generally negative and significant, while those on trade costs were 
insignificant.  However, they did not include country effects or account for dynamic properties 
of the panel data.  The parent (US) trade cost (TCP) has the expected negative effect on affiliate 
sales.  Overall, the basic knowledge-capital variables -- country size, similarity, and differences 
in factor endowments -- all strongly affect manufacturing affiliate activity in the aggregate. 
  Of central interest here are the results for individual (though still highly aggregated) 
sectors.  As shown by the estimates from regressions (3) and (4), the food-manufacturing sector 
behave similarly to overall activity in terms of the market-size variables.  The fact that larger 
differences in GDP reduce sales supports the notion that there is much horizontal (market-
seeking) FDI in the food-manufacturing sector, which generally consists of differentiated 
goods.  However, there is a significant difference as regards factor endowments.  Higher 
differences in the supplies of skilled-labor expand affiliate sales, supporting the idea of   16  
fragmentation of production between headquarters activity and affiliate assembly.  In this 
regard, the food-manufacturing sector displays strong elements of both types of FDI incentives.  
Multinational firms both seek large markets to extend their sales overseas and engage in labor-
intensive assembly operations.  Overall, the food-manufacturing sector seems to follow the KC 
model closely.     The other sectoral results may be interpreted analogously.   In  the 
chemicals sector (regressions 5 and 6) the effect of market size factors is consistent with the 
predictions of the KC model indicating a positive relationship between market size and affiliate 
sales.  However, skill and capital endowments have statistically insignificant impacts on 
affiliate sales volumes.  This result likely reflects the fact the chemical industry has higher than 
average numbers of local production affiliates working under license to U.S. parents that 
produce typically for the domestic market (Maskus, 2000).  Because this is true in both 
developed and developing host economies the specific role of endowments may be limited in 
this sector.  In contrast, in the machinery manufacturing sector (regressions 7 and 8), 
differences in both skilled-labor and capital endowments reduce sales, while investment costs 
in the host country (ICH) tend to reduce affiliate sales.  These results suggest that machinery is 
more characterized by market-seeking investment than by fragmentation incentives.  
  Results from regressions (9) and (10) for electronics exhibit a distinctive pattern, 
supporting the need for incorporating both skills and physical capital.  In regression (9) we find 
that the direct influence of SKDIFF is to increase affiliate sales significantly (suggesting 
fragmentation) while that of PKDIFF is to reduce sales (suggesting market-seeking FDI in 
countries with similar capital stocks).  The former impact is anticipated as electronics are 
perhaps the best example of products where assembly may be divided from design.   
Meanwhile, in this sector the host-country’s trade costs, interacted with skill differences,   17  
sharply reduce sales, consistent with fragmentation of assembly. The coefficient on host-
country investment costs is significantly negative as expected.  The last sector we include is 
transportation equipment in columns (11) and (12).  Here we also find an indication of 
horizontal FDI associated with skilled-labor and physical capital endowment differences.  In 
general, the various regression results confirm the KC model in that joint market size, 
differences in endowments, host country’s investment costs (ICH) and trade costs (TCH) have 
a statistically significant effect on sales volumes.  However, there are detectable differences in 
these influences across manufacturing industries. 
Local Affiliate Sales 
  The results in Table 2 consider local sales of the affiliate as a second measure of 
affiliate activity.  In principle, such effects should be more sensitive to market-seeking factors.  
Inspection of the table shows that the coefficients are generally smaller than those in Table 1, 
which reflects the fact that local sales are a subset of total sales.  Otherwise the qualitative 
conclusions are quite similar.  We highlight here a few differences of interest in the sectoral 
regressions.  First, in the food-manufacturing sector (regressions 3 and 4) we find that the direct 
influence of SKLDIFF is to increase affiliate sales, suggesting fragmentation.  However, 
PKDIFF has a negative effect on affiliate sales, suggesting market-seeking FDI in countries 
with similar capital stocks.  Second, in machinery the interaction term on skill differences and 
host trade costs is significantly negative in the local sales regression, suggesting that in this 
sector domestic sales are highly responsive to trade barriers for given differences in 
endowments.  In other words, where endowment differences are large, countries with high trade 
costs are not likely to attract machinery plants, even for local markets.  While this outcome also 
holds for transportation equipment it is not significant.  Moreover, it does not hold for the food-  18  
manufacturing and electronics sectors.  Finally, the coefficient on parent-country trade costs is 
significantly negative for chemicals and electronics.   
Affiliate Exports 
  Table 3 turns to affiliate exports (both to the United States and third markets) in order to 
isolate the impacts of knowledge-capital determinants on international trade.  In general we 
would expect the GDP variables (size and dissimilarity) to be less important and the 
endowment difference variables to be more important in explaining exports than affiliate sales.  
Comparison of tables 1 and 3 shows this to be the case in many sectors.  The interactions 
between size differences and endowment differences are somewhat smaller, though retaining 
their expected signs.  In total manufacturing, both trade and investment costs in the host 
country significantly reduce affiliate exports.  
  With the exception of the food-manufacturing sector, the results for exports are quite 
similar across specific sectors.  For example, manufactured food exports display a pattern 
similar to the results for affiliate sales (see table 1).  The estimates for differences in skilled 
labor endowments have the expected positive signs, indicating that assembly for exports takes 
advantage of different labor skills, and are statistically significant.  Squared differences in GDP 
have a negative impact on affiliate exports, suggesting that US investments meant for re-export 
in this sector in small countries is minimal.   Investment and trade costs have insignificant 
effect on affiliate exports in manufactured food.  In summary, in this sector market size is 
important for local sales but not exports. The picture that emerges is one in which US parent 
companies in food and kindred products invest for market-seeking purposes in larger and more 
skill-abundant and capital-abundant countries, and for purposes of assembly and exports in 
smaller and less skill and capital-abundant countries, while the latter effect is attenuated by   19  
higher local trade barriers (Table 2).  Here, the food-manufacturing sector departs from some 
others, including chemicals and machinery, in which exports behave similarly to local sales.  It 
is most similar to electronics (regressions (9) and (10)), where GDP differences expand 
exports, as do differences in skill endowments.  In contrast to results from the food-
manufacturing sector, investment and trade costs have a significant impact on exports in several 
other sectors.   
 5. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
Relative to international trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) has experienced 
phenomenal growth in the past few decades.  The rapid growth in FDI relative to traditional 
trade has generated much interest among economists regarding the nature of the location and 
production decisions of multinational firms.  Until recently, due to theoretical and data 
constraints, it has not been possible to simultaneously model the two major motivations for the 
behavior of MNEs: horizontal (market-seeking) and vertical (lower factor cost-seeking) FDI.  
However, CMM (2001) and Markusen and Maskus (2001, 2002) recently proposed the 
knowledge-capital (KC) model, which provides a general-equilibrium modeling framework for 
simultaneously testing both motives for FDI. 
  In this paper, we extend the KC model of MNEs by investigating whether its 
predictions hold at the sectoral level for affiliate sales and exports.  We also extend the 
methodological framework to examine the role of differences in physical-capital endowments 
(see Bergstrand and Egger, 2007) and we explicitly account for the dynamic nature of 
international investment data via the use of the GMM technique.  Specifically, we estimate the 
KC model for all manufacturing industries (aggregated) and five manufacturing sectors, over a 
panel data set involving 39 FDI-recipient countries over a 15-year period.     20  
The empirical results indicate that in a number of sectors, including food manufacturing 
and chemicals, squared differences in GDP reduce affiliate sales, bespeaking the importance of 
market-seeking investment incentives across destination countries.  At the same time, 
differences in relative skilled-labor endowments have a positive and significant effect on 
foreign affiliate sales and exports  in  food products and electronics . These results suggest that 
vertical FDI motivations are also important for MNE activities in these industries.  In contrast, 
the machinery sector exhibits evidence of primarily horizontal FDI behavior, as affiliate sales 
are negatively affected by differences in both skill and physical-capital endowments.  For its 
part, the transportation-equipment industry demonstrates more vertical fragmentation as a result 
of skilled-labor and capital-stock variations across host nations.  This result likely reflects the 
significant global networks that have emerged in automobile assembly and trade in 
intermediate automobile parts.   
Thus, our empirical results imply that the predictions of the KC model regarding MNE 
behavior vary by the type of industry.  It is plausible to expect significant differences in the 
behavior of MNEs who specialize in diverse areas of production (e.g., food products versus 
electronics products).  While production processes in electronics and transportation-equipment 
are more characterized by efficient vertical specialization of R&D activities and assembly, 
other sectors have more complex motivations, as suggested by Yeaple (2003).    Therefore, 
empirical analyses that only focus on highly aggregated data at the national level may not 
adequately reflect the diversity of MNE activities across various industries.      Future research 
could extend this analytical approach to the firm level when appropriate data become available.    21  
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Total Manufacturing      Food and Kindred Products      Chemicals           Machinery          
   (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)     (8)    
SALES 
LAGGED  0.73 *  0.74 *  0.69 *  0.67 *  0.50 *  0.62 *  0.64 *  0.61 * 
GDPSUM  7.46 *  8.36 *  0.80 *  0.76 *  1.25 *  0.85 *  1.62 *  1.67 * 
GDPDSQ  -2.54E-04 *  -3.32E-04 *  -3.16E-05 *  -2.76E-05 *  -4.85E-05 * -3.46E-05 *  1.17E-05   1.12E-05    
SKLDIFF  -20839.42   -66970.94 *  15532.59 *  21328.50 *  251.39   -3645.22     -28270.08 *  -9626.99    
PKDIFF      0.35 *      -0.01         0.01         -0.19 * 
GDPD*SKD  -1.86   3.31     -1.90 *  -2.68 *  -0.38   0.00     -1.16   -4.95 * 
GDPD*PKD      -2.64E-05 *      2.97E-06         6.19E-07         2.10E-05 * 
ICH  -51.62 **  -13.15     -0.21   2.85     -22.09 *  -12.75 **  -33.70 *  -33.98 * 
TCH  5.13   -27.98     -8.89   -9.82 **  1.05   -4.03     1.09   8.94    
TCH*SKDSQ  424.97   -247.25     201.14   -107.02     236.82   138.51     244.43   553.21    
TCH*PKDSQ      2.20E-08         7.81E-09 **     2.21E-09        
-1.30E-
08    
TCP  -57.22 *  -45.78 *  -2.20     -2.48     -16.97 *  -16.07 *  0.09     -3.19    
observations  443   443     329   329     409   409     309   309   
                           
Diagnostics                                    
Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions:                                            
Chi-squared  439.45   360.52     286.48   289.02     460.37   495.03     377.74   375.34    
P-Value  0.28   0.20     0.40   0.14     0.18   0.21     0.48   0.23    
                                     
Arellano-Bond test serial correlation:                                        
Ho: no autocorrelation of 1st order                               
Z-Value  -10.75   -9.96     -7.70   -7.52     -5.48   -6.09    -4.99    -4.97     
Ho: no autocorrelation of 2nd order                               
Z-Value  1.32     1.22     -0.42     -0.40     0.37     0.38     -1.05     0.89    
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Table 1. Continued 
Variables 
 
 Electronics     
 
Transportation Equipment     
   (9)     (10)     (11)     (12)    
SALES 
LAGGED  0.77 *  0.77 *  0.68 *  0.68 * 
GDPSUM  0.94 *  0.93 *  1.72 *  1.76 * 
GDPDSQ  -1.11E-05   -9.58E-06     -1.50E-05   -3.60E-05    
SKLDIFF  12967.06 *  16688.65 *  16085.76   14699.53    
PKDIFF      -0.06 *      0.26 * 
GDPD*SKD  -1.69 *  -2.44 *  -1.78   -0.44    
GDPD*PKD      8.05E-06 *      -1.60E-05 * 
ICH  -18.03 **  -20.33 *  -19.81   -11.54    
TCH  9.49   4.39     -20.75   -28.85    
TCH*SKDSQ  -648.97 *  -570.22 *  348.41   -227.65    
TCH*PKDSQ      7.51E-09         2.09E-08    
TCP  -1.38     -0.40    -9.75     -6.38     
Observations                   
  315   315     274   274    
Diagnostics                   
Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions:                     
Chi-squared  235.18   237.64     227.34   231.24    
P-Value  0.47   0.88     0.18   0.78    
                   
Arellano-Bond test serial correlation                
Ho: no autocorrelation of 1st order             
Z-Value  -10.64   -10.65     -9.36   -9.60    
Ho: no autocorrelation of 2nd order             
Z-Value -0.64      -0.55     -0.59     -0.49    
Note: Statistical significance is indicated as: 5 percent (**) and 10 percent (*) levels, respectively.   26  
 
Table 2. GMM Regression Results: Affiliate Sales on Local Market 
Variables  Total Manufacturing     Food and Kindred Products     Chemicals           Machinery          
   (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)     (8)    
SALES 
LAGGED  0.74 *  0.74 *  0.40 *  0.46 *  0.59 *  0.55 *  0.25 *  0.25 * 
GDPSUM  5.53 *  6.07 *  0.81 *  0.58 *  1.47 *  1.80 *  2.14 *  2.30 * 
GDPDSQ  -2.22E-04 *  -2.47E-04 *  -1.71E-05   -3.80E-05 **  -8.61E-05 * -1.04E-04 *  -6.07E-05 * -6.56E-05 * 
SKLDIFF  5883.55   -13512.01     12405.00 **  7584.96     1886.22   -864.19     -79.52   3423.05    
PKDIFF  -0.69    0.16  **      -0.05         0.01         -0.04    
GDPD*SKD      0.99     -1.38  **  -0.31     0.47    1.02     -0.60    -0.77    
GDPD*PKD      -1.20E-05         7.97E-06         -1.90E-06         7.54E-07    
ICH  -14.61   -7.87     -8.28   -8.74     -8.73   -9.27     -10.49   -11.71    
TCH  0.24   -13.00     -15.54 *  -5.29     3.96   3.24     35.47 *  32.55 * 
TCH*SKDSQ  -205.63   -868.53     364.47   -13.45     59.87   -200.17     -1305.69 *  -1601.66 * 
TCH*PKDSQ      2.33E-08         3.36E-09         7.63E-09  **      8.61E-09    
TCP  -15.13     -10.92     5.63     3.02     -12.97  *  -12.53  *  -0.76     -0.78    
Observations  341   341     209   209     333   333     232   232    
                              
Diagnostics                                     
Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions:                                             
Chi-squared  341.91   344.68     203.61   123.83     329.89   310.00     286.78   284.35    
P-Value  0.44   0.12     0.66   0.95     0.40   0.25     0.16   0.65    
                                     
Arellano-Bond test serial correlation:                                        
Ho: no autocorrelation of 1st order 
                             
Z-Value -8.03    -7.68      -5.00   -5.16     -9.37   -8.46     -3.41   -3.33    
Ho: no autocorrelation of 2nd order 
                            
Z-Value  -0.49   -0.82     0.95   0.46     0.66   0.46     0.33   -0.30    
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Table 2. Continued 
Variables 
  
Electronics     
 
Transportation Equipment     
   (9)     (10)     (11)     (12)    
SALES 
LAGGED  0.727 *  0.679 *  0.220 *  0.168 * 
GDPSUM  0.645 *  0.543 *  0.987 *  0.742 * 
GDPDSQ  -2.81E-05 *  -2.22E-05     3.25E-06   3.77E-05 ** 
SKLDIFF  7316.963   10496.820     38150.140 *  45921.360 * 
PKDIFF      -0.057         -0.058    
GDPD*SKD  -1.701 **  -2.296 *  -2.277 **  -4.072 * 
GDPD*PKD     9.09E-06  *      5.71E-06     
ICH  -0.642   1.280     1.784   -0.530    
TCH  -1.148   -0.529     10.764   -1.697    
TCH*SKDSQ  167.023   274.152     -344.981   -184.469    
TCH*PKDSQ      -4.02E-09         3.15E-10    
TCP  -12.666 **  -12.262 **  -1.592     4.201    
Observations  229   229     212   212    
             
Diagnostics                   
Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions:                     
Chi-squared  168.620   155.310     167.170   251.030    
P-Value  0.989   0.767     0.122   0.174    
                   
Arellano-Bond test serial correlation:                 
Ho: no autocorrelation of 1st order                 
Z-Value  -7.290   -6.940     -3.910   -3.960    
Ho: no autocorrelation of 2nd order                 
Z-Value  -0.460   -0.650     -1.350   -1.320    
Note: Statistical significance is indicated as: 5 percent (**) and 10 percent (*) levels, respectively.   28  
Table 3. GMM Regression Results: Affiliate Exports 
Variables  Total Manufacturing     Food and Kindred Products   Chemicals           Machinery        
   (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)     (8)    
EXPORTS 
LAGGED  0.74 *  0.74 *  0.64 *  0.66 *  0.48 *  0.43 *  0.62 *  0.61 * 
GDPSUM  1.56 *  1.57 *  0.30 **  0.27     0.55 *  0.79 *  0.25   0.51    
GDPDSQ  -1.92E-04 *  -1.87E-04 *  -4.64E-06   -2.54E-07     -5.39E-05 *  -8.15E-05 *  -1.10E-05   -1.77E-05    
SKLDIFF  -21688.28   -30049.93     15363.39 *  24152.43 *  -3898.11   -10258.73     -27118.11 *  -34242.32 ** 
PKDIFF      0.00         -0.05         0.08 **     -0.10 ** 
GDPD*SKD  -0.61   -1.31     -1.68 *  -3.16 *  0.46   1.76     -0.51   0.51    
GDPD*PKD      8.80E-06         9.54E-06 *     -7.36E-06         3.83E-06    
ICH  -68.17 *  -63.73 *  4.25   5.11     -8.73   -3.00     -24.85   -37.55 ** 
TCH  -45.65 *  -49.89 *  4.16   5.23     13.79 **  18.07 *  -0.74   1.08    
TCH*SKDSQ  1772.71 *  1957.04 *  -86.00   -292.75     -108.78   47.45     1002.76   1368.10 ** 
TCH*PKDSQ      -3.29E-09         3.83E-09         -6.60E-09         -5.95E-09    
TCP  -32.91 *  -28.65     0.63     -0.04     -12.70 *  -12.86 *  -32.05 *  -35.82 * 
Observations  259   259     114   114     188   188     198   198    
                               
Diagnostics                                     
Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions:                                             
Chi-squared  300.330   301.290     99.420   94.930     150.180   131.460     219.150   188.010    
P-Value  0.150   0.972     0.305   0.903     0.659   0.352     0.115   0.345    
                                     
Arellano-Bond test serial correlation:                                        
Ho: no autocorrelation of 1st order                                   
Z-Value  -5.390   -5.390     -2.790   -2.870     -5.110   -4.860     -3.760   -3.770    
Ho: no autocorrelation of 2nd order                                   
Z-Value  0.740   0.710     -0.530   -0.450     1.430   1.440     0.800   0.820    
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Table 3. Continued 
Variables  Electronics          
  
Transportation Equipment  
   (9)     (10)     (11)     (12)    
EXPORTS 
LAGGED  0.64 *  0.71 *  0.77 *  0.90 * 
GDPSUM  0.30 **  0.25     0.06   0.40    
GDPDSQ  0.00 *  0.00 *  0.00   0.00    
SKLDIFF  6837.82   13194.35 **  19966.07 *  3491.63    
PKDIFF      -0.03         0.15 ** 
GDPD*SKD  -0.87   -1.30 *  -2.25 *  -0.72    
GDPD*PKD      0.00         0.00    
ICH  -14.13 **  -9.95     -6.34   -0.21    
TCH  7.18   3.95     -8.32   -11.22    
TCH*SKDSQ  -195.74   -493.94 **  183.87   132.19    
TCH*PKDSQ      0.00         0.00    
TCP  3.41     4.64     1.10     1.00    
Observations  185   185     196   196   
                
Diagnostics                         
Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions:                     
Chi-squared  207.85   202.39     234.79   153.83    
P-Value  0.30   0.13     0.28   0.79    
                   
Arellano-Bond test serial correlation:                
Ho: no autocorrelation of 1st order               
Z-Value -4.36    -4.47      -4.33   -6.64    
Ho: no autocorrelation of 2nd order               
Z-Value -1.14    -1.47      -0.69   -0.28    
Note: Statistical significance is indicated as: 5 percent (**) and 10 percent (*) levels, respectively. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 In the empirical analysis we consider capital stock as a third endowment.  
2 Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2003) in their reply point out that the alternative specification is unlikely to capture relationships in the underlying data given its 
strict interpretation. 
3 Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) also include a bilateral distance variable but since this measure is time-invariant we exclude it from our analysis, which is 
based on dynamic panel regression methods. 
4 The year fixed effects are included in the estimation. 
5 The BEA data underwent a significant sectoral revision in 2000, making it difficult to extend the data meaningfully beyond 1999. 
6 These figures were kindly provided by Professor Peter Egger. 
7 The list of countries used in the analysis includes: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, 
Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Venezuela.  The list of sub-sectors includes: 
food and kindred products, chemicals and allied products, industrial machinery and equipment, electronics, primary and fabricated metals, transportation 
equipment, other manufacturing, and wholesale trade.  However, we exclude the aggregate of all industries, primary and fabricated metals, and wholesale trade in 
order to focus on sectors that are strictly manufacturing.  
8 Summary statistics at the aggregate level and by sectors are available on request. 
 
 